Hauerwas on Teaching

From Faith and Theology, an excellent quote from Stanley Hauerwas that grants some insight into his pedagogy:

“As a way to challenge such a [liberal] view of freedom, I start my classes by telling my students that I do not teach in a manner that is meant to help them make up their own minds. Instead, I tell them that I do not believe they have minds worth making up until they have been trained by me. I realize such a statement is deeply offensive to students since it exhibits a complete lack of pedagogic sensitivities. Yet I cannot imagine any teacher who is serious who would allow students to make up their own minds.”

—Stanley Hauerwas, “Christian Schooling or Making Students Dysfunctional,” in Sanctify Them in the Truth: Holiness Exemplified

One day, I can only hope, that'll be me!

4 Guiding Questions

During my time at grad school, and especially while writing my dissertation, I imagine I'll investigate the confluence of the following four questions:

1. Biblical Scholarship: What is the biblical understanding of time? What is the Christian's eschatology?

2. Historical Theology: How did the Victorians read the Biblical texts in developing their eschatology?

3. Poetics: How do Victorian poets create expectations for a poem's ending, and how do they fulfill or deny those expectations?

4. Cognitive Science: What are the physical and mental aspects influence our experience of expectation and fulfillment, and how might these insights be applied to reading or hearing poetry?

The general goal will be to develop a faithful interdisciplinary project which seeks to understand human knowledge, expectations, and belief in light of the writing and reception of Victorian poetry. I'll examine the importance of the ending for human understanding in light of Christian eschatology.

Orhan Pamuk on being a Writer

"For me, to be a writer is to acknowledge the secret wounds that we carry inside us, wounds so secret that we ourselves are barely aware of them, and to patiently explore them, know them, illuminate them, own them, and make them a conscious part of our spirit and our writing."
~From his Nobel Lecture on Literature, "My Father's Suitcase"

Oakes on Pure Nature

Edward Oakes, writing on recent discussions within the Catholic Church on limbo, has a very helpful synopsis of the debate concerning human nature, in which Henri de Lubac was a chief participant. This synopsis came a little late for me, since I was introduced to the topic through John Milbank's The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural, which I hardly understood when I first read it last Christmas--an appropriate time to read a book on the relationship between grace and human nature. (I also picked up a copy of one of Lubac's key works on the subject, The Mystery of the Supernatural, at Loome a couple weeks ago.) So, here's Oakes:

"Parallel to this debate on limbo was another one concerning “pure nature.” If we grant that God created us all with a desire for union with him, does that not imply an “obligation” on his part to grant us the fulfillment of that desire, since he created us for union with him? But does that “obligation” on God’s part not in turn undermine the concept of the gratuity of grace, which says that God is under no obligation to grant what is freely his to give? Hence the concept of “pure nature,” which was, as everyone conceded, a purely theoretical distinction, made solely to guard the concept of gratuitous grace. But, as far as de facto creation went, Augustine himself says, “Our hearts are restless until they rest in thee.” And does not Thomas Aquinas say that “every intellect naturally desires the vision of the divine substance” (Summa Contra Gentiles III, 3)?

That of course is only one sentence from the vast sea of Thomas’ writings, and many other Thomists dispute the point, citing other texts. I cannot take a position on that debate here. All I want to say is that if Henri de Lubac is right in his book The Mystery of the Supernatural, then this conclusion inexorably follows:

It is said that a universe might have existed in which man, though without necessarily excluding any other desire, would have his rational ambitions limited to some lower, purely human, beatitude. Certainly I do not deny it. But having said that, one is obliged to admit—indeed one is automatically affirming—that in our world as it is this is not the case. . . . [Thus] the “desire to see God” cannot be permanently frustrated without an essential suffering. To deny this is to undermine my entire Credo. For is not this, in effect, the definition of the “pain of the damned”? And consequently—at least in appearance—a good and just God could hardly frustrate me, unless I, through my own fault, turn away from him by choice. The infinite importance of the desire implanted in me by my Creator is what constitutes the infinite importance of the drama of human existence.

This is hardly the place to resolve this extremely complex debate. I only wish to point out how many theological presuppositions come into play when theologians discuss the Eschaton in its relation to the sacraments, grace, free will, and sin (both original and personal)."

Ricoeur: Freud and Philosophy

To prepare for a possible class this fall on time and narration, I'm reading some Paul Ricoeur--someone I've heard a lot about but never read. The first part of _Freud and Philosophy_ is the "problematic." The "epistemological problem" he addresses in this first part is "What is interpretation in psychoanalysis, and how is the interpretation of the signs of man interrelated with the economic explanation that claims to get at the root of desire?" (p xii).

Here are a few definitions Ricouer offers early in part one:

Hermeneutics: The "theory of the rules presiding over an exegesis (the interpretation of a particular text)" (8).

Symbol: A "double or multiple meaning linguistic expression that requires an interpretation" (9).

Interpretation: A "work of understanding that aims at deciphering symbols" (9).

Sign (distinguished from "symbol"): A double duality consisting of the signifier-signified duality and the duality between the entire signifier-signified relationship and the thing or object designated by this relationship (12).

Symbols (again, in relation to "sign"): "Multiple-meaning expressions whose semantic texture is correlative to the work of interpretation that explicates their second or multiple meanings" (13).

Francis Bacon on Reading

Francis Bacon: “Read not to contradict and confute; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider.” Wise words for those trying to engage responsibly and lovingly with the authors one is reading--the weighing and considering demands a deep reflection upon the work in question, before one writes or speaks in response.

Cornel West in The Hedgehog Review

Cornel West's discussion of the role of the intellectual and of the university in the latest issue of The Hedgehog Review (pp 88-89):

"The very existence of the university is a quest for truth (small 't'), a quest for knowledge (small 'k'). Its very important. . . You never really possess the truth, but we're after it. . . So even if you bring critique to bear on universities, they have to somehow justify what they're doing in light of that quest. Not a McCarthyism or the escalating authoritarianism now among certain universities; they can just say explicitly, 'Well, you know, we don't take that quest for truth that seriously.'"

What West identifies as the end of the university, the constant, never-ending quest for truth and knowledge, is decried by conservative Christians as "forsaking truth," not taking it "that seriously." But what West and intellectuals like him have right is that things now aren't as they should be, that we can only see dimly. Christians should learn to be more carefully about the emphasis they place upon truth-it's certainly important, but also incomplete.

What we can add to West's vision, however, is the eschatological imagination to guide us in that quest for truth, so that the end isn't the quest itself, but only the prelude to seeing, one day, face to face. How should one articulate a critique of both West's vision and today's popular evangelical vision, in light of the need for a stronger grasp on the end we will one day share? What would this renewed vision look like in practice

Ancient Greece in the 19th Century

The great 19th century thinkers invoked the spirit of the Ancient Greeks just as the Greeks themselves invoked the muses. Cf Williams _Shadow of the Antichrist_ 30-33, also Butler _The Tyrrany of Greece over Germany_. What's the rhetorical effect of this invocation; how does it relate to the critique of Christianity and the rise of atheism in c19? How does this reflect a larger battle within that century between Ancient Greece and Christianity, Dionysus against the Crucified?

Marx, Neitzsche, and Freud on Weakness and Power

Merold Westphal, in _Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism_, suggests a useful typology for understanding how the Masters of Suspicion understood the relationship between power and religion within society:

For Freud, religion is primarily ontological weakness seeking consolation.
For Marx, religion is primarily sociological power seeking legitimation.
For Nietzsche, religion is primarily sociological weakness seeking revenge.

Marilynne Robinson: "The Tyranny of Petty Coercion"

From her book _The Death of Adam: Essays on Modern Thought_, pp. 255-263.

1. Courage--specifically moral courage, the courage to stand up for truth--is in short supply these days, and its dearth is especially felt in our political life.

2. Group boundaries are constantly policed to ensure certain words, words that have fallen out of style like "liberal" or "Christian" are not used. If such words are used, they're quickly labeled "partisan" or "-bashing" and the offender is simply written off and ignored.

3. To use such unfashionable words in the strong sense in which you know them to be true and valuable is an example of an act of courage, and one we need to see more often.

David Bentley Hart: "Nihilism and Freedom: Is There a Difference?"

Following is a summary of a recent lecture by David Bentley Hart here at the University of Minnesota, which I organized.

Before a crowd of roughly 75 U of M students, faculty, staff, and community members, David Bentley Hart offered a lecture last Thursday, March 22 on the topic of freedom and nihilism. He made clear at the outset that he was using the term “nihilism” not in a pejorative sense, but rather as a strictly technical philosophical definition: Nihilism as a fairly peaceful mode of existence that seeks to give up any claims to the desire to rule by force through metaphysical schemes, which ultimately destroy even God in their libido dominandi.

Hart sought to understand two competing notions of freedom in Western culture: How have we come to an understanding of freedom as the absence of strictures, as the glorification of will (and therefore nihilistic, since there is nothing higher than an individual’s will)? Why did we move away from the earlier understanding of freedom as a structure for choosing well, towards the good, in accordance with our nature? What, if anything, can be said in support of either definition of freedom?

As an aside, Hart mentioned that if the will is truly free, there’s no reason why it must remain confined to each individual person. We might, for instance, choose to refashion humanity in accordance with our utterly free will, something unthinkable in previous centuries.

Nietzsche’s story of the channeling of the gods into God and then into ourselves (with the subsequent “death of God”) and Heidegger’s tale of Christianity as one more attempt among many throughout the history of Western philosophy to master reality through a metaphysical scheme both have much to commend. The Christian tradition has, in fact, led us to our current nihilistic understanding of freedom.

But, Hart claims, this has not occurred for the reasons outlined by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Rather, our notion of the Christian God had, since the time of the scholastics, contained within itself the nihilism that would work itself out into our understanding of our own freedom as humans. In emphasizing God’s absolute will at the expense of focusing on his nature, scholastics such as John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham laid the groundwork for theological reflection throughout the centuries to come.

Rather than God being the eternal good, God has simply become the biggest individual around, and in exalting his absolute sovereignty, even regarding good and evil, we have sought to appropriate that same absolute freedom of will in our own lives. But to this God, Heidegger claimed, “man can neither pray nor make sacrifices,” and he must be abandoned. Hart stated that the godless thinking which has resulted from this abandonment of God is perhaps closer to the true understanding of God than the scholastics’ understanding, upon which both Catholic and Reformed theologies draw.

Hart concluded by affirming Heidegger’s recognition that our modern conception of freedom, nihilistic at its core, has to some degree resulted from the misguided voluntaristic turn of Christian theology. Before such theology, Hart emphasized, atheism is a preferable alternative.

The lecture concluded with a response by a University of Minnesota Professor of Cultural Studies and Comparative Literature, Dr. Timothy Brennan. Dr. Brennan suggested that Hart's own reference to and conversation with Nietzsche and Heidegger was part of a trend within academic discourse which itself perpetuates the nihilistic culture Hart descried, by promoting a limpid individualism at the expense of substantial political engagement. A vigorous question and answer period closed out the evening.

3 Points: Introduction

Tim Brennan, one of my professors as an undergraduate, frequently encouraged us in class to never read a work, article, essay, chapter, etc. without writing down the author's 2-3 main points. If we were unable to do this, he said, we hadn't understood the text nor would we remember anything from it. Understanding and remembering are both necessary to faithful reading, not to mention a fulfilling life, so I'm trying to follow Professor Brennan's advice. All the posts under "3 Points" headings will contain a few basic ideas from whatever I'm reading, mostly for my own benefit and future reference, thanks to the blog's incredibly handy "Label" feature. But anyway, maybe the points will be helpful to others reading the same works or interested in the same topics.

Sobering Statistics

Geoff Holsclaw recently published some statistics on his blog, which speak for themselves in view of the President's recent State of the Union:

for the time being: Stats to Go Along with the State of the Union

Narration and the Church

As the church, we must “realize that reality is about narration and that we must fully engage in the process of narrating our story in Christ passed down from the apostles in the church until he comes.

“Our relation to the world isn’t to assume a superior position over other narratives but to enter alongside and allow the extension of our Narrative to engage the alternate worlds and their narratives until the eschaton.”

So says David Fitch at the church and postmodern culture. What I like about these paragraphs is they already begin to practice what they preach: our narrative engages “the alternate worlds and their narratives,” not simply “the alternate worldviews and their narratives.” In other words, the way we narrate the world truly affects our interaction with the world itself. Our ideas matter, because they fuel our actions. If we believe the Christian narrative of a loving peace that has overcome (in part, though one day in full) the world’s violence, our interactions with other narratives will be formed by that same loving peace.

What do such interactions founded upon belief in a fundamental peace look like? First, I think they exhibit a quickness to actively listen, to fully understand what another person is saying and why they are saying it. Second, I think they exhibit a generous of spirit that seeks the good, rather than the questionable or heterodox, in what the other person says. Finally, they seek to embrace embrace that good and seek ways to show how Christ is himself the source and fulfillment of that goodness.