Ricoeur: Freud and Philosophy

To prepare for a possible class this fall on time and narration, I'm reading some Paul Ricoeur--someone I've heard a lot about but never read. The first part of _Freud and Philosophy_ is the "problematic." The "epistemological problem" he addresses in this first part is "What is interpretation in psychoanalysis, and how is the interpretation of the signs of man interrelated with the economic explanation that claims to get at the root of desire?" (p xii).

Here are a few definitions Ricouer offers early in part one:

Hermeneutics: The "theory of the rules presiding over an exegesis (the interpretation of a particular text)" (8).

Symbol: A "double or multiple meaning linguistic expression that requires an interpretation" (9).

Interpretation: A "work of understanding that aims at deciphering symbols" (9).

Sign (distinguished from "symbol"): A double duality consisting of the signifier-signified duality and the duality between the entire signifier-signified relationship and the thing or object designated by this relationship (12).

Symbols (again, in relation to "sign"): "Multiple-meaning expressions whose semantic texture is correlative to the work of interpretation that explicates their second or multiple meanings" (13).

Francis Bacon on Reading

Francis Bacon: “Read not to contradict and confute; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider.” Wise words for those trying to engage responsibly and lovingly with the authors one is reading--the weighing and considering demands a deep reflection upon the work in question, before one writes or speaks in response.

Cornel West in The Hedgehog Review

Cornel West's discussion of the role of the intellectual and of the university in the latest issue of The Hedgehog Review (pp 88-89):

"The very existence of the university is a quest for truth (small 't'), a quest for knowledge (small 'k'). Its very important. . . You never really possess the truth, but we're after it. . . So even if you bring critique to bear on universities, they have to somehow justify what they're doing in light of that quest. Not a McCarthyism or the escalating authoritarianism now among certain universities; they can just say explicitly, 'Well, you know, we don't take that quest for truth that seriously.'"

What West identifies as the end of the university, the constant, never-ending quest for truth and knowledge, is decried by conservative Christians as "forsaking truth," not taking it "that seriously." But what West and intellectuals like him have right is that things now aren't as they should be, that we can only see dimly. Christians should learn to be more carefully about the emphasis they place upon truth-it's certainly important, but also incomplete.

What we can add to West's vision, however, is the eschatological imagination to guide us in that quest for truth, so that the end isn't the quest itself, but only the prelude to seeing, one day, face to face. How should one articulate a critique of both West's vision and today's popular evangelical vision, in light of the need for a stronger grasp on the end we will one day share? What would this renewed vision look like in practice

Ancient Greece in the 19th Century

The great 19th century thinkers invoked the spirit of the Ancient Greeks just as the Greeks themselves invoked the muses. Cf Williams _Shadow of the Antichrist_ 30-33, also Butler _The Tyrrany of Greece over Germany_. What's the rhetorical effect of this invocation; how does it relate to the critique of Christianity and the rise of atheism in c19? How does this reflect a larger battle within that century between Ancient Greece and Christianity, Dionysus against the Crucified?

Marx, Neitzsche, and Freud on Weakness and Power

Merold Westphal, in _Suspicion and Faith: The Religious Uses of Modern Atheism_, suggests a useful typology for understanding how the Masters of Suspicion understood the relationship between power and religion within society:

For Freud, religion is primarily ontological weakness seeking consolation.
For Marx, religion is primarily sociological power seeking legitimation.
For Nietzsche, religion is primarily sociological weakness seeking revenge.